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Trade Costs, Quality, and The Skill Premium
ABSTRACT: We develop a monopolistic competition model with nonhomothetic fac-
tor input bundles where increasing quality requires increasing use of skilled workers. As a
result more skill abundant countries export higher quality, higher priced goods. Using a
multicountry dataset we test and confirm the findings in Schott (2004) of a positive effect
of skill abundance on unit values identified with US data. We extend the core model
with per unit trade costs leading to the Washington-apples effect that goods shipped over
larger distance are of higher quality. The combination of high-quality goods being rela-
tively skill intensive with the Washington-apples effect implies that countries at a larger
distance from their trading partners display a higher skill premium. Simulating our model
we find that a doubling of distance of a country relative to all its trading partners raises
the skill premium in a country by about 2.3 percent.
Keywords: Traded goods prices, exporter skill abundance, nonhomothetic factor in-
puts, per unit trade costs, skill premium
JEL codes : F12, F14
1 Introduction
In a seminal paper based on U.S. import data, Schott (2004) found that traded goods
prices within detailed product categories rise in the skill and capital abundance of the
exporting country. As such he provided evidence for within-sector specialization. Broadly
speaking, goods prices vary systematically even for similar goods sharing the same detailed
product classification. More skill-abundant and capital-abundant countries export goods
with higher prices. Higher prices are taken as evidence of higher quality.
While Schott’s (2004) findings highlight the importance of exporter characteristics,
and especially skill abundance in exporting countries, the theoretical literature that fol-
lowed has focused instead on explanations based on distance and importer characteristics
in explaining international pricing patterns.1 The related empirical literature has also
followed this route. As such, we are left with evidence based largely on one country, the
U.S., with respect to exporter characteristics.
1Manova and Zhang (2012), Verhoogen (2008), Kugler and Verhoogen (2012), Crozet, et al. (2012),
Martin (2012), Go¨rg, et al. (2010), Bastos and Silva (2010), Hallak and Sivadasan (2010) are examples
of studies with firm level prices. Hummels and Skiba (2004), Hummels and Lugovskyy (2009), Baldwin
and Harrigan (2011), Harrigan, et al. (2011) and Bekkers, et al. (2012) use average prices at various HS
levels.
In this paper we return to Schott’s original observations on exporters and test his
findings on the effect of skill abundance on traded goods prices employing a multicountry
dataset with multiple exporters and importers. Compared to Schott, our data allow for
inclusion of various fixed effects to control for possible omitted variables and we also
estimate non-linear specifications. After the empirical exercise we model the link between
skill abundance and pricing in a monopolistic competition framework with homogeneous
firms in the spirit of Krugman (1980), adding a role for quality. So, preferences are CES
including a taste parameter as a measure for quality. We work with a variant of the
Krugman model developed by Venables (1994) with fixed export costs besides regular
fixed costs.2 This implies separate free entry conditions for each destination market and
the possibility that only a subset of firms export. There are two factor inputs, high
skilled and low skilled labor, and factor input bundles are non-homothetic. Goods with
higher quality require relatively more skilled labor. Moreover, similar to Baldwin and
Harrigan (2011) and Feenstra and Romalis (2014), the marginal cost parameter rises with
quality. This setup gives a straightforward explanation for the relation between exporter
skill abundance and traded goods prices in Schott (2004). In relatively skill abundant
countries the relative wage of skilled workers is lower, implying a lower cost of producing
high quality goods. This raises the incentive for firms to produce higher quality goods.
And goods of higher quality display higher marginal costs raising the price.
We first define a basic model to analytically derive the impact of skill abundance on
traded goods prices. Then we extend the basic framework with two additional elements
from the literature on traded goods prices and solve the model with simulations. First,
we add per unit trade costs to the model, besides the standard iceberg trade costs. This
generates a Washington apples effect as in Hummels and Skiba (2004). Goods shipped at
larger distance have a higher quality. Second, we include a taste for quality parameter on
the demand side and following Hallak (2006) this parameter is a function of income per
capita. This implies that richer consumers demand higher quality goods. With quality
being relatively skill-intensive countries at a larger distance from their trading partners
will produce higher quality goods raising the relative demand for skilled workers and thus
the skill premium.
We solve the extended model numerically calibrating it to actual income, income per
2The model setup of Venables (1994) with destination specific fixed costs is chosen to keep the model
tractable enough to derive analytical results. Generating an effect of skill abundance on quality requires
a non-homothetic cost function. This reduces the tractability of the model implying that we need to keep
other modelling features as basic as possible. As we are interested in explaining aggregate traded goods
prices and not firm level prices, we can abstract from firm heterogeneity as used for example in Bernard,
et al. (2007).
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capita and distance data for the largest countries in the empirics. Parameters appearing
in Feenstra and Romalis (2014) are set as estimated by these scholars. The remaining
parameters are taken from the literature and set such that the estimated elasticities of
the fob-price with respect to skill abundance and distance employing data following from
model simulations are close to the elasticities estimated with real-world data. Model
simulations show that the combination of per unit trade costs and high-quality goods
being skill intensive generates an intuitive relationship between trade costs and the skill
premium. An increase in distance raising per unit trade costs relative to ad valorem
trade costs generates a Washington apples effect, raises the quality of exporter’s goods
and therefore also the demand for skilled workers. Simulations show that a doubling of
distance of a country from its trading partners raises the skill premium by 2.3 percent.
Our simulations indicate that there is also a demand-side effect on the distribution of
income. Richer consumers benefit more from quality increases as quality as they have
a higher valuation for quality. This reinforces the effect on the nominal skill premium,
although the effect in our simulations is an order smaller than the effect on the nominal
skill premium.
Based on the above exposition our contribution to the literature is thus twofold. First,
we introduce a mechanism through which distance affects the skill premium as a result
of the combination of the Washington apples effect and the relative skill intensity of
high quality goods. Second, we provide an evaluation of Schott’s U.S. based results with
respect to factor abundance using a wider dataset on traded goods prices with multiple
importers and exporters.
For the empirics we employ a large, multi-country dataset with product level (HS6)
unit values for the period 2000-2004. The empirics confirm the main prediction of our
model and the findings in Schott (2004). A larger relative skill abundance of the exporting
country leads to higher traded goods prices. Based upon our model we also examine the
effect of distance and exporter gdp per capita on unit values. We include an importer-
product-time fixed effect to capture the role of importer gdp per capita and variation in
the definition of unit values across products. With this fixed effect we can also account
for other relevant demand side variables not present in our theoretical model like market
size and income inequality. The coefficients on distance and exporter gdp per capita have
the expected positive signs. We estimate the same model including nonlinear terms. The
results confirm the findings of the (log) linear model with marginal effects close to the
linear specification.
The related literature can be split up into three parts, first work on explaining traded
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goods prices, second work on between country differences in the incentive to produce
quality and third work on trade and inequality. Most theoretical work explaining traded
goods prices focuses on demand side characteristics3, on distance4 or on firm characteris-
tics.5 The work by Feenstra and Romalis (2014) includes many elements of this literature.
Feenstra and Romalis (2014) set up a firm heterogeneity model of quality differentiation
with per unit trade costs and demand for quality varying with importer income per capita.
They estimate model parameters structurally, using trade and price data. In our model
simulations we build on Feenstra and Romalis (2014), by using their estimated elasticities
and extending their framework with a role for factor abundance on the supply side.
Flam and Helpman (1987), Hummels and Klenow (2005) and Fieler (2012) also model
between country differences in the incentive to produce and export goods of different
quality. In these papers differences in the ability to produce quality stem from absolute
productivity differences between countries, but are not related to factor abundance. 6
Early work related to our paper is Falvey (1981), who develops a specific factors model to
explain intra-industry trade as a result of factor differences between countries. Although
his model also features quality differentiation endogenous to factor differences, he does
not purport to relate prices to country characteristics and instead focuses on explaining
intra-industry trade with factor differences.7
Fajgelbaum, et al. (2011) combine non-homothetic preferences with increasing returns
in production, showing that richer countries specialize in the production of high-quality
goods. Although our extended model also contains non-homothetic preferences, there is
no home-market effect of quality specialization in our model. The reason is that quality
and fixed costs are destination-specific: firms have to pay fixed costs to enter each market
and sell a different quality level to each country. So, having a large home market for
high-quality goods does not imply that high-quality goods are also exported by more
firms. Dingel (2014) models the two mechanisms in Schott (2004) and Fajgelbaum, et al.
(2011) leading to a positive effect of exporter income per capita on the quality of exports
3See for example Flam and Helpman (1987), Hallak (2006), Hsieh and Klenow (2007), Hummels and
Lugovskyy (2009), Simonovska (2010), Alessandria and Kaboski (2011) and Bekkers, et al. (2012)
4See among others Hummels and Skiba (2004), Baldwin and Harrigan (2011).
5See among others Verhoogen (2008), Kugler and Verhoogen (2012), Hallak and Sivadasan (2010)
6Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) relate the quality of output to quality of inputs in a model where more
productive firms use higher quality inputs, because of complementarity between productivity and input
quality.
7Bekkers (2013) proposes a different mechanism to explain the effect of skill abundance on quality and
traded goods prices. In a firm heterogeneity model, firms can raise the quality of their goods by investing
more in innovation. With factor input bundles in innovation being relatively skill intensive, more skill
abundant countries produce higher quality, higher priced goods.
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and determines the relative importance of the two mechanisms with data on intra-US
trade. Our model does not feature the home-market effect. Instead we include per unit
trade costs generating an effect of distance on the skill premium, also solving our model
numerically to quantify the effect.
The recent literature on trade and inequality has proposed various mechanisms to
explain rising inequality in all countries as a result of trade liberalization, moving away
from the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin framework where inequality effects differ according
to relative factor abundance of the country. Four sets of studies are related to our work.
First, Verhoogen (2008) shows how trade liberalization can raise wage inequality in a firm
heterogeneity model where more productive firms produce higher quality goods and pay
higher wages. Trade liberalization will reallocate market shares towards more productive
exporting firms paying higher wages and thus raising wage inequality. Burstein and Vogel
(2012) and Harrigan and Reshef (2011) model a similar mechanism in a firm heterogene-
ity model with more productive firms being more skill intensive. Trade liberalization
reallocates market shares towards more productive and more skill intensive firms, raising
the demand for skills and thus the skill premium. Similar to these models, in our model
higher quality goods (or more productive firms) are also more skill intensive. The way in
which changes in trade costs generate more demand for quality instead is different. In the
mentioned studies this occurs through a reallocation effect towards more productive firms
and in our paper this occurs through a change in the strength of the Washington-apples
effect: when per unit trade costs become more important relative to ad valorem trade
costs, the demand for quality rises. Second, Caron, et al. (2011) show that there is a
positive relation between the sectoral income elasticity of demand and the skill intensity,
implying that rising income will lead to increased demand for skills thus raising the skill
premium.8 Our model features a similar mechanism, as rising income (possibly as a result
of trade liberalization) raises the demand for high-quality and thus more skill-intensive
goods. Third, Matsuyama (2007) shows that trade can drive up inequality if activities
related to international business are relatively skill intensive. Fourth, Fajgelbaum and
Khandelwal (2014) show that trade affects the income distribution through the demand
side under non-homothetic preferences, a mechanism also present in our model. Fajgel-
baum and Khandelwal (2014) find that trade in general is good for poor consumers.
The next section starts with an analysis of the multi-country price data providing
motivating evidence for the theoretical model. Section 3 outlines both the baseline theo-
retical model on the role of factor abundance and the model with extensions. In section 4
8The published version, Caron, et al. (2014), does not discuss the skill premium implications.
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we present a numerical analysis of the extended theoretical model and section 5 concludes.
2 Motivating Evidence
Before developing a theoretical model we first explore the link between traded goods prices
and skill abundance with a multicountry dataset, extending the work by Schott (2004) who
employed only data on exports to the US. We proxy traded goods prices with unit values.
The data used for unit values come from the BACI database 9 which contains quantity
and the value of bilateral imports in 6-digit Harmonized System (HS) classification. The
database is constructed from COMTRADE (Commodities Trade Statistics database).
We use data for the period between 2000-2004. BACI takes advantage of the double
information on each trade flow to fill out the matrix of bilateral world trade providing a
“reconciled’ value for each flow reported at least by one of the partners. Therefore the
missing values in BACI are those concerning trade between non reporting countries.
Skill abundance and income per capita data originate from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicator database. We use GDP per capita as a measure of income per
capita. Similarly to Schott (2004) we define skilled labor as workers with tertiary or
secondary education, while unskilled labor as having only primary education. Data on
distance are taken from Clair et al (2004).10 Some descriptive statistics on our sample
and the list of countries used in the regressions based upon data availability can be found
in Appendix C
We include distance in all regressions to account for the Washington apples effect
meaning that quality rises with distance, an empirical finding first discovered by Alchian
and Allen (1964) and explored in a trade setting by Hummels and Skiba (2004). We
control for the role of demand side variables like importer market size and importer
income inequality by including importer-time-product fixed effects. The product specific
fixed effects serve to account for differences in measurement of unit values across products.
Table 1 presents the estimation results. In column 1 we start with a linear specification
with distance and skill abundance as explanatory variables and in column 2 we add GDP
per capita as a control variable. Our results are in line with the empirical results of
Schott (2004) who found a positive effect of exporter skill abundance on unit values with
US importer data. We further explore similarities and differences between our results
and Schott (2004) in Appendix B. Controlling for GDP per capita the coefficient on skill
9http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/baci/baciwp.pdf
10http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm. The distance data are calculated following the
great circle formula, which uses latitudes and longitudes of the relevant capital cities.
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abundance drops from 0.095 and 0.057. Due to the correlation with GDP per capita, the
coefficient becomes lower once GDP per capita is also included. Our estimation results
imply that a 10% increase in relative skill abundance is associated with an increase in
traded goods prices of between 0.9% and 0.6%. We find that prices increase with distance
supporting the Washington-apples effect. Furthermore, GDP per capita of the exporter
country has a positive effect on export unit values throughout all specifications with a
coefficient between 0.19 and 0.15.
To check for nonlinearities we add nonlinear terms (squares and interaction terms)
in column 3 with the marginal effects displayed in column 4. The interaction term be-
tween skill abundance ln S
U
and GDP per capita is significant, implying that some of the
effects are nonlinear. The marginal effects are very close to the coefficients of the linear
specification.
In column 5 we use sector and importer-country specific estimates of the product
substitution elasticity estimated by Broda, et al. (2006) to examine the interaction effect of
skill abundance in exporter countries with the product substitution elasticity in importer
countries.11 Broda, et al. (2006) estimate the substitution elasticities for 73 countries at
the HS6 level.12 The coefficient of the interaction term is negative and non-significant.13
Below we will show that effects are similar in the simulations with our theoretical model
displaying a very small effect of the substitution elasticity on the impact of skill abundance
on traded goods prices.
Finally we evaluate the importance of exporting fixed costs and the extensive margin
for traded goods prices. Columns six and seven show that measures of both variables
are insignificant. As will be discussed below this is in line with simulations with the
theoretical model, where these variables are also insignificant.14
To summarize, our estimation results indicate that countries export higher priced,
higher quality products when they are more skill abundant. They thus show that the
results of Schott (2004) also hold when we take a wider sample of importing countries
beyond the US, although the impact of relative skill abundance is a bit lower for the larger
sample of importing countries (see for further discussion on the comparison between Schott
(2004) and our results Appendix B).
11We cannot include the measure itself as we have sectoral fixed effects
12The data can be downloaded from http://www.columbia.edu/˜dew35/TradeElasticities/TradeElasticities.html
13We also explored the interaction effect with σ in the nonlinear model and effects are very similar.
Results are available upon request.
14Controlling also for GDP per capita, the extensive margin measure becomes significant with a positive
sign. This result is hard to interpret and so we conclude that the effect of the extensive margin is not
robust to variation in control variables.
7
Table 1: Effect of relative skill abundance, control variables and interactions with substi-
tution elasticities on unit values
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
lnUVklmt marg effects
ln (S/U) 0.095∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ -0.009 0.094∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.017) (0.131) (0.023) (0.017) (0.025) (0.025)
ln distance 0.116∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.257∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.017) (0.144) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
lnGDPpc 0.150∗∗∗ -0.045 0.191∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.129) (0.035) (0.022)
exportfc 0.007
(0.006)
extmarg -3.406
(2.667)
(ln (S/U))
2
0.13
(0.011)
ln (S/U) ln distance -0.008
(0.013)
ln (S/U) lnGDPpc 0.048∗∗
(0.022)
lnGDPpc ln distance 0.005
(0.012)
(lnGDPpc)
2
0.026
(0.016)
(ln distance)
2
-0.008
(0.009)
ln (S/U) ∗ lnσ -2.28e-0.6
(5.38e-06)
Constant 1.536 1.035∗∗∗ 0.739 1.541∗∗∗ 1.541∗∗∗ 1.543∗∗∗
(0.132) (0.152) (0.577) (0.152) (0.139) (0.134)
Observations 23,632,862 23,632,862 23,632,862 23,632,862 23,174,457 23,632,862
Adjusted R2 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.62
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by exporters. Importer-product-time fixed effects
are included in all specifications. ln (S/U) is the exporter’s skill abundance defined as the log of
the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers. ln distance is the log of distance between the exporter
and importer country capitals. lnGDPpc is the log of GDP per capita of the exporter country in
1000 dollars. lnσ is the product substitution elasticity
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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3 Theoretical Model
The modelling setup follows Venables (1994), adding endogenous quality and nonhomoth-
etic factor cost bundles. We model an economy with two countries indexed by k, l = H,F ,
two factors of production, skilled workers S and unskilled workers U . All workers in the
two countries have identical preferences.
3.1 Demand
Utility in country k, Qk, consists of a CES composite of domestic varieties Qkk and
foreign varieties Qlk with substitution elasticity ε. Preferences for both domestic and
foreign varieties are a CES function over a continuum of varieties ω ∈ Ωkk and ω ∈ Ωlk
with substitution elasticity σ:
Qk =
(
Q
ε−1
ε
kk +Q
ε−1
ε
lk
) ε
ε−1
(1)
Qlk =
 ∫
ω∈Ωlk
(z (ω) q (ω))
σ−1
σ dω
 σσ−1 (2)
qω and zω are respectively the quantity and quality of variety ω. Variables with a subscript
lk represent flows from country l to country k. Demand for variety ω by all consumers in
country k imported from country l is given by:
qlk (ω) = zlk (ω)
σ−1 plk (ω)
−σ P σ−εlk P
ε−1
k Ik (3)
The price index Pk and Plk are defined as:
Pk =
(
P 1−εkk + P
1−ε
lk
) 1
1−ε (4)
Plk =
 ∫
ω∈Ωlk
(
p (ω)
z (ω)
)1−σ
dω
 11−σ (5)
Ik is total income in country k and the sum of skilled and unskilled labor’s income:
Ik = w
s
kSk + w
u
kUk (6)
wsk and w
u
k are respectively the wages of skilled and unskilled workers and Sk and Uk the
number of skilled and unskilled workers.
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3.2 Supply
We now turn to the supply side. Like in Krugman (1980) firms are identical and can
produce with an identical increasing returns technology with a fixed cost f . Following
Venables (1994) firms have to pay market specific fixed costs.15 So a firm from country
k pays domestic fixed costs to sell in its home market, fkk and additional exporting fixed
costs fkl to sell abroad. We can interpret the fixed costs as beachhead costs to enter a
market. Beachhead costs for each market are intuitive in a setting where firms produce
different quality levels for different destination markets depending on market conditions in
the destination. Destination specific fixed costs also enable us to derive analytical results
in the basic model. As explained by Venables (1994) a setup with an upper Armington nest
together with destination specific fixed costs implies selection into exporting with only a
subset of firms exporting. Without the Armington nest, the four free entry conditions (two
for each country) following from destination specific fixed costs would not be independent
and thus not allow for both trading and non-trading firms. Selection is a property of
our model setup, but is not important for the results on traded goods prices in the basic
model as firms are homogeneous and per unit trade costs are absent. In the extended
model with per unit trade costs changes in the number of exporting firms (the extensive
margin) might affect traded goods prices, since per unit trade costs imply that exported
goods are of higher quality.
Marginal costs for sales to a specific destination (domestic and exporting) are a func-
tion of the quality of the good sold in the destination with an elasticity 1/θ. θ is called
the quality elasticity in Baldwin and Harrigan (2011) and it is a measure for the ability to
produce high quality goods.16 Also Feenstra and Romalis (2014) work with this relation
between quality and marginal costs. The total cost function Ck of a firm from country k
is given by:
Ck (zkk, zkl, wks, wku) =
∑
l=H,F
(
z
1
θ
klτklqkl + fkl
)
CBkl (7)
τkl are iceberg trade costs. CBkl is the cost of input bundles used in production and fixed
costs and defined as follows:
CBkl = CB (zkl, wks, wku) =
(
(zηklw
s
k)
1−ρ + ϑ (wuk)
1−ρ
) 1
1−ρ
(8)
We assume η > 0. The expression for the cost of input bundles in (8) implies that an
15Also Jean (2002) and Melitz (2003) work with fixed export costs.
16To be precise, the quality elasticity as defined in Baldwin and Harrigan (2011) is equal to θ − 1 in
our model.
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increase in quality raises the weight of skilled workers in the input bundle. Therefore,
relatively more high skilled workers are required for higher quality goods. So, the cost
function is non-homothetic and to allow for variation in the substitution elasticity between
high skilled and low skilled workers, we work with a nonhomothetic CES cost function
as in Shimomura (1999) with ρ the substitution elasticity between skilled and unskilled
labor in the cost of input bundles in (8).17 ϑ is a CES-shifter used in the calibration to
generate a positive skill-premium, i.e. wsk > w
u
k .
We choose the functional form zηkl for the CES-weight to be able to derive analytical
results on the effects of skill abundance on quality and traded goods prices in the baseline
model. With our specification costs depend on quality through marginal costs and through
the non-homotheticity of the input bundles.
Using the expression for demand in equation (3) and the cost function as specified in
equation (7), each firm maximizes profits pik choosing the price pkl and quality zkl:
pik =
∑
l=H,F
((
pkl
zkl
)1−σ
P σ−εkl P
ε
l Il −
(
z
1
θ
+σ−1
kl τklp
−σ
kl P
σ−ε
kl P
ε
l Il + fkl
)
CBkl
)
(9)
Each firm produces a unique variety. Maximizing profits with respect to the price pkl
generates the following markup equation for the cif price:
pkl =
σ
σ − 1z
1
θ
klτklCBkl (10)
Taking the first order condition of profit in equation (9) with respect to quality and
substituting the markup pricing equation in (10) leads to:
pklqkl
σ
(
(σ − 1) θ−1
θ
zkl
+
σ − 1
CB
∂CB
∂zkl
)
+ fkl
∂CB
∂zkl
= 0 (11)
The domestic and exporting market can be seen as separate markets, because there
are fixed exporting costs besides regular fixed costs. Entering the domestic market and
paying the domestic beachhead cost does not imply that a firm can also export as in
Krugman (1980). This implies that there are two separate zero profit conditions, one for
17The production function corresponding to the cost function CB in equation (8) is given by
Y (zkm, Uk, Sk) =
((
Sk
zηkm
) ρ−1
ρ
+ ϑ
1
ρU
ρ−1
ρ
k
) ρ
ρ−1
.
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the domestic market and one for the exporting market:18
pklqkl
σ
= fklCBkl (12)
The derivative of CBkl in equation (8) with respect to zkl is equal to:
∂CBkl
∂zkl
=
ηCBρkl (z
η
klw
s
k)
1−ρ
zkl
(13)
Substituting the zero profit conditions in equations (12) and the expression for ∂CB
∂zkl
into
equation (11) leads to:
(σ − 1) θ−1
θ
zkl
− ση (z
η
klw
s
k)
1−ρ
zklCB
1−ρ
kl
= 0 (14)
The first term in equation (14) represents the balance of the marginal benefit of higher
quality as a result of larger sales and the increase in marginal cost of higher quality. The
second term represents the marginal cost of higher quality due to a larger required use of
the more expensive skilled labor. The balance of the two determines the optimal level of
quality.
Using the expression for CBkl in equation (8), equation (14) can be rewritten to express
the relative wage
wsk
wuk
as a function of quality zkl with ζ defined as ζ =
σ−1
σ
θ−1
θ
1
η
:
wuk
wsk
= zηkl
(
1− ζ
ζ
) 1
1−ρ
(15)
3.3 Effect of Skill Abundance
To derive the effect of skill abundance on quality, we add the labor market equilibrium
conditions for skilled and unskilled workers. Applying Shephard’s lemma to the cost
function in equation (7) and using the rewritten free entry conditions, z
1
θ
klqkl + fkl = σfkl,
gives:
Sk =
∑
l=H,F
NklσfklCB
ρ
kl (z
η
kl)
1−ρ (wsk)
−ρ (16)
Uk =
∑
l=H,F
NklσfklCB
ρ
klϑ (w
u
k)
−ρ (17)
We can divide the labor market conditions in equations (16)-(17), using the fact that
18Venables (1994) works with one free entry condition for firms selling only in the domestic market and
one free entry condition for firms selling in both markets. This is equivalent to our approach with a free
entry condition for each market.
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quality zkl does not vary with the destination market without per unit trade costs and a
role for importer gdp per capita. This leads to the following expression:
Sk
Uk
=
(zηkl)
1−ρ
ϑ
(
wuk
wsk
)ρ
(18)
Substituting equation (15) into (18), we can solve for quality zkl as a function of relative
skill abundance Sk/Uk:
zkl =
(
1
ϑ
Sk
Uk
) 1
η
(
ζ
1− ζ
) 1
η
ρ
1−ρ
(19)
So, quality zkl rises in relative skill abundance
Sk
Uk
.
We can easily determine the effect of relative skill abundance on the export price.
From equation (10) the export price pkl is determined by the level of quality zkl and the
cost of input bundles CBkl:
pkl =
σ
σ − 1
(
Sk
Uk
) 1
ηθ
(
ζ
1− ζ
) ρ
η(1−ρ)θ
τklCBkl (20)
In Appendix A we show that the relative change of unit wage costs as a result of a
change in the relative wage
wsk
wuk
is zero when taking into account the endogenous reaction
in quality. The direct effect of a larger relative skilled wage
wsk
wuk
exactly cancels out against
the effect of the reduction in quality induced by a larger relative skilled wage. So the
costs of input bundles do not vary with relative wages. Hence, the effect of relative skill
abundance is determined by the direct effect in equation (20) displaying an elasticity of
the price pkl with respect to skill abundance of
1
ηθ
. So we have the following result:
Result 1 In the baseline model export goods from relatively more skill abundant countries
have a larger quality and a higher price.
The model presented in this section contains a link between skill abundance, quality
and market price. In a more skill abundant country, the relative wage of skilled workers
is lower. Therefore, the marginal cost of producing higher quality goods falls. As a result
firms will offer higher quality goods.19 The relations are consistent with the empirical
findings by Schott (2004). A larger relative skill abundance in an exporting country leads
to a higher export quality and a higher export price.
19Scope for quality differentiation implies that in our model larger relative skill abundance and thus
relatively lower skilled wages lead to higher prices. This in contrast to the standard Heckscher-Ohlin
factor abundance model where larger skill abundance and thus lower skilled wages lead to lower prices.
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3.4 Model with Extensions
In this section we add two additional features to the baseline skill abundance model, a
taste for quality that is varying with income as in Hallak (2006) and per unit trade costs
as in Hummels and Skiba (2004). With these extensions our model becomes close to
the model in Feenstra and Romalis (2014) with two main differences. First, we extend
the model with a role for skill abundance and second we limit the model by abstracting
from firm heterogeneity and instead working with destination-specific fixed costs as in
Venables (1994). Firm heterogeneity is not important for our paper since we focus on
aggregate traded goods prices and not on firm-level prices. Moreover, since we cannot
solve for quality explicitly with our extensions, firm heterogeneity would make simulations
intractable.
The first additional feature is introduced as in Feenstra and Romalis (2014) using the
dual approach starting from the expenditure function. The expenditure function Evk of a
worker of type v, v = s, u, is defined as
Evk = Q
v
kP
v
k = Q
v
k
(
K∑
l=1
(P vlk)
1−ε
) 1
1−ε
(21)
P vlk =
 ∫
ω∈Ωlk
(
p (ω)
z (ω)α
v
k
)1−σ
dω
 11−σ (22)
K is the number of countries, not necessarily limited to 2. αvk measures the importance
of quality for consumers in country k and αvk is a function of utility of a worker of type v
in country k, Qvk:
αvk = 1 + λ lnQ
v
k (23)
The expenditure function differs across the two types of workers, since the importance of
quality for consumers is a function of utility. Demand qlk (ω) is the sum of demands of
the two types of workers and follows from the expenditure function in (21)-(22):
qlk (ω) =
∑
v=s,u
qvlk (ω) = plk (ω)
−σ ∑
v=s,u
zlk (ω)
αvk(σ−1) (P vlk)
σ−ε (P vk )
εQvk (24)
Price plk and quality zlk are the same for the two types of workers, since we assume
that the fixed costs involved in developing a new variety are sufficiently large to make it
unprofitable to sell the different types of workers goods with different quality levels.
The second extension to the baseline model consists of the inclusion of both iceberg
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trade costs τkl and per unit trade costs Tkl. Per unit trade costs will generate a Washington
apples effect that exported goods are of higher quality. The expression for total costs of
a firm from country k becomes:
Ck (zkk, zkl, w
s
k, w
u
k) =
K∑
l=1
(
τkl
(
z
1
θ
kl
CBkl
ϕk
+ Tkl
)
qkl +
CBkl
ϕk
fkl
)
(25)
Following Feenstra and Romalis (2014), iceberg trade costs are paid over costs inclusive of
per unit trade costs. ϕk is a country-level productivity measure, transforming the number
of skilled Sk and unskilled workers Uk into the effective number of skilled and unskilled
workers, respectively S˜k and U˜k:
S˜k = ϕkSk; U˜k = ϕkUk (26)
The productivity term ϕk is introduced to be able to calibrate income per capita to a
desired level.
Employing the expression for CBkl in equation (8) and the free entry condition,
pklqkl =
σfklCBkl
ϕk
, profit maximization generates the following markup pricing equation
and first order condition for quality:20
pkl =
σ
σ − 1τkl
(
z
1
θ
kl
CBkl
ϕk
+ Tkl
)
(27)
∑
v=s,u
χvklα
v
l
(
z
1
θ
kl
CBkl
ϕk
+ Tkl
)
− 1
θ
z
1
θ
kl
CBkl
ϕk
+
σCBklϕk z 1θkl + Tkl
σ − 1
 η (zηklwsk)1−ρ
CB1−ρkl
= 0 (28)
With the share of spending by workers of type v = s, u in country l on goods from country
k, χvkl, given by:
χvkl =
pklq
v
kl
pklqkl
=
z
αvl (σ−1)
kl (P
v
kl)
σ−ε (P vl )
εQvl∑
w=s,u
z
αwl (σ−1)
kl (P
w
kl)
σ−ε (Pwl )
εQvl
(29)
The first term in equation (28) is the marginal benefit of higher quality as a result of
larger sales. The second term represents the direct marginal cost of higher quality and
the third term represents the marginal cost of higher quality due to a larger required use
of the more expensive skilled labor both in variable costs and fixed costs. The balance of
the three terms determines the optimal level of quality.
20Derivation in Appendix A. Because of the two income groups we cannot work with quality-adjusted
price and quantity as in Feenstra and Romalis (2014) to derive the first order condition.
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The FOC for quality zkl nests both our baseline model and the model in Feenstra and
Romalis (2014). Setting αvl at 1 and Tkl at 0, the FOC in equation (28) will be identical to
the FOC in the baseline model. Setting η at zero and thus eliminating the third term in
equation (28) and equating αvl across the two income groups, α
v
l = αl, leads to the same
(explicit) solution for quality zkl as in Feenstra and Romalis (2014), z
1
θ
kl =
θαlTkl
1−θαk
ϕk
CBkl
.21
The inclusion of the productivity shifter ϕk and per unit trade costs Tkl implies that
the expressions for labor market equilibrium become:
Sk =
K∑
l=1
Nkl
σCBklϕk z 1θkl + Tkl
CBkl
ϕk
z
1
θ
kl + Tkl
 fkl
ϕk
CBρkl (z
η
kl)
1−ρ (wsk)
−ρ (30)
Uk =
K∑
l=1
Nkl
σCBklϕk z 1θkl + Tkl
CBkl
ϕk
z
1
θ
kl + Tkl
 fkl
ϕk
CBρklϑ (w
u
k)
−ρ (31)
To complete the characterization of equilibrium, we need to determine the number of
domestic and exporting firms in each country, respectively Nkk and Nkl, for which we use
two equations. First, the expenditures to factor payments can be expressed as follows:
K∑
l=1
Nkl
σz 1θkl CBklϕk + Tkl
z
1
θ
kl
CBkl
ϕk
+ Tkl
 fklCBkl
ϕk
= wukUk + w
s
kSk (32)
Second, following Venables (1994) we combine the free entry condition, the expression for
the price index and the markup pricing rule to express the share of exporting firms as
follows:
(
Nkk
Nlk
)σ−ε
σ−1
=
CBlk
ϕl
CBkk
ϕk
flk
fkk
∑
v=s,u
z
αvk(ε−1)
kk (P
v
k )
εQvk∑
v=s,u
z
αvk(ε−1)
lk (P
v
k )
εQvk
 τlk
(
z
1
θ
lk
CBlk
ϕl
+ Tlk
)
τkk
(
z
1
θ
kk
CBkk
ϕk
+ Tkk
)
ε−1 (33)
We can now define equilibrium as follows:
Definition 1 Equilibrium in the model is defined by a tuple of vectors in all countries k
for all workers v, {wvk, αvk, Qvk, Evk , P vk }, in all pairs of countries k and l, {zkl, CBkl, Nkl},
21An explicit expression for zkl is indispensable to solve the model under firm heterogeneity, also when
using numerics. The reason is that the free entry condition is expressed as an integral over all active
firms. Feenstra and Romalis (2014) do not solve for all endogenous variables in the model and leave
the free entry condition aside. Moreover, they can solve explicitly for zkl as there is no role for factor
abundance. To be able to solve and simulate the model we thus have to work with identical firms.
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and in all pairs of countries k and l for all workers v, {P vkl} and is determined by the
following equations in all countries k:
1. The expression for the cost of input bundles in equation (8) to each destination
market l
2. The expression for expenditure in equation (21)
3. The expression for the price index in equation (22)
4. The expression for the quality elasticity with respect to utility in equation (23)
5. The markup pricing rule in equation (27) to each destination market l
6. The FOC for quality in equation (28) to each destination market l
7. Labor market equilibrium for skilled and unskilled workers in equations (30) and
(31)
8. The income identity in equation (32)
9. The expression for the share of exporting firms in equation (33)
4 Numerical Analysis of the Theoretical Model
In this section we numerically solve the extended model with multiple countries as defined
in Definition 1 to explore the effect of distance on the skill premium through quality
specialization.22 We simulate the model with five countries with values for the exogenous
variables equal to the values for the largest five countries in our empirical exercise in terms
of GDP.
In the simulations we concentrate on the fob price, as our traded goods price data are
also fob prices. The fob price can be expressed as a function of the cif price as follows:
pfobkl =
pcifkl
τkl
− Tkl (34)
We start in the next subsection with a discussion of model calibration. In the following
subsections we present simulation results on the role of the extensive margin and the
effect of distance on the skill premium. We close this section with robustness checks of
the simulation results to variations in parameter values.
22The GAMS code of the numerical models is available upon request.
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Table 2: Baseline values of parameters
Parameter Value Description Source
σ 6.07 Substitution elasticity between varieties
on product market Feenstra and Romalis (2014)
λ 0.021 Elasticity of taste for quality parameter
with respect to income/capita Feenstra and Romalis (2014)
θ 0.61 Elasticity of marginal costs
with respect to quality Feenstra and Romalis (2014)
κ 0.1 Elasticity of per unit trade costs wrt distance Feenstra and Romalis (2014)
ε 1.2 Armington substitution elasticity
on the product market Feenstra, et al. (2014)
ρ 1.2 Substitution elasticity between skilled
and unskilled labor Hertel, et al. (2012)
fkk 1 Fixed costs of production
fkl 1 Exporting fixed costs
dkl data Distance between countries Clair et al (2004)
Sk
Uk
data Relative skill abundance WDI
Uk data Number of unskilled workers WDI
ϕk data Productivity WDI
ϑ 0.14 CES-shifter low-skilled labor Acemoglu (2003)
η 0.79 Elasticity of skilled factor intensity
with respect to quality Simulations
δ 0.05 Elasticity of ad valorem trade costs
with respect to distance Simulations
4.1 Calibration
Table 2 displays the parameter values used in the simulations with the extended model,
their description and their source. Model parameters and exogenous variables are on the
one hand taken from the literature and the data (section 4.1.1) and on the other hand
calibrated to match the regression results with real-world data (section 4.1.2).
4.1.1 Parameters and Data from the Literature
We select parameters and data from four different sources. First, for all parameters also
appearing in Feenstra and Romalis (2014), we use the values estimated by these scholars.
So, the substitution elasticity σ between varieties is set at 6.07; the elasticity of the taste
for quality parameter with respect to income per capita, λ, is set at 0.021; the elasticity
of marginal costs with respect to quality, θ, is set equal to 0.61; and the elasticity of per
unit trade costs with respect to distance is equal to 0.1.
Second, for some parameters specific to our model and not appearing in Feenstra
and Romalis (2014), we select values from the literature. The Armington substitution
elasticity ε is taken from Feenstra, et al. (2014) who come to estimates for the substitution
elasticity between domestic and foreign varieties (the ’macro’ elasticity) around 1. We
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choose a value of 1.2 to avoid convergence problems appearing for values of ε close to 1.
The substitution elasticity between factor inputs not taking into account quality changes
is set at 1.2, corresponding with the median value across sectors in Hertel, et al. (2012).
Fixed production costs fkk are set at 1. Bernard, et al. (2007) work with an equally
arbitrary value of 0.1 in their simulations, motivating this value with the fact that 0.1 is
5% of their value for sunk entry costs. Given that we do not have sunk entry costs, we
can choose a value of 1 for fixed costs without loss of generality. Following Bernard, et
al. (2007) exporter fixed costs are set equal to domestic fixed costs, so that without per
unit and ad valorem trade costs selling at home and abroad would be equally attractive.
Third, values for distance dkl and skill abundance
Sk
Uk
are set equal to the values in the
dataset used for the empirics, using data of the largest five countries in terms of GDP.
Domestic distance is set equal to internal distance as reported in Clair et al (2004). The
trade literature works increasingly with positive domestic trade costs, see for example
Ramondo, et al. (2014). Fourth, the number of unskilled workers Uk and productivity
ϕk are determined endogenously, imposing that income and income per capita are equal
to the dataset-values used in the empirics.23 In a similar way the CES-shifter on low-
skilled labor, ϑ, was set at 0.14 in order to generate an average skill premium of 1.6,
corresponding with a log skill premium of 0.47 reported in Acemoglu (2003).
4.1.2 Calibrated Parameters
We calibrate the elasticity of skilled factor intensity with respect to quality, η, and
the elasticity of iceberg trade costs with respect to distance, δ, such that the esti-
mated elasticities of the fob-price with respect to skill abundance and distance employ-
ing data following from model simulations are close to the elasticities estimated with
real-world data. In the simulations both distance dkl and skill abundance
Sk
Uk
are var-
ied randomly three times each around their respective dataset-values dkl and
Sk
Uk
, using
dkl = dkl (1 + uniform(−0.01, 0.01) and SkUk =
Sk
Uk
(1 + uniform(−0.01, 0.01). For each
of the nine variations the model is solved thus mimicking variation over time in these
variables. Log-fob-prices following from the simulation outcomes are then regressed on
log-skill-abundance and log-distance including as in the empirical analysis combined fixed
effects for each importer-loop pair. This procedure is repeated 200 times.24
Table 3 displays the average estimated coefficients and standard errors of the regres-
23Income Ik is defined as Ik = wksSk + wkuUk and income per capita ik as ik =
wksSk+wkuUk
Sk+Uk
.
24In all the simulations we check the SOC defined in Appendix A. It is satisfied for all simulations.
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Table 3: Estimated elasticities of fob-prices with respect to skill abundance and distance
with simulated data
Variable Average coefficient Average standard error
Skill abundance Sk
Uk
0.0925 0.00546
(0.0254) (0.00126)
Distance dkl 0.121 0.00143
(0.00759) (0.000332)
The table displays the average coefficient and the average standard error of 200 importer fixed
effects regressions of the fob-price on skill abundance and distance, all measured in logs
Standard errors of the 200 repititions in parentheses
sions with the simulated data, setting η at 0.79 and δ at 0.05.2526 The table shows that
the estimated elasticities following from the model simulations are close to the empirically
estimated elasticities of 0.095 and 0.094 for skill abundance and 0.116 and 0.127 for dis-
tance in respectively the linear and nonlinear specification. The average standard error
shows that the coefficients are very significant and the standard errors of the simulations
between brackets show that the estimated coefficients do not vary much over the different
iterations.
4.2 The Role of the Extensive Margin
This subsection explores the effect of the extensive margin on traded goods prices. There is
selection into exporting in our model, as only a fraction of all firms export. The fraction of
firms exporting is likely to exert an effect on export quality and thus on export prices. If a
larger fraction of firms exports, demand for high skilled workers will go up, since exported
goods are of higher quality and thus require more high skilled workers. We evaluate the
effect of the extensive margin on fob prices with our numerical model randomly varying
fixed export costs relative to fixed domestic costs. Column one of table 4 displays the
outcomes of regressing fob prices on the extensive margin, defined as the fraction of
exporting firms relative to domestic firms, averaged over all export destinations. Skill
abundance and distance are also included as regressors and the estimation is repeated 200
times. The table shows that the extensive margin has on average a small negative impact
on fob prices. Still, the standard error of the average coefficient between parentheses is
25In searching for δ and η, δ was limited between 0 and 0.1, as the elasticity of ad-valorem trade costs
with respect to distance should be smaller than the elasticity of per unit trade costs with respect to
distance to generate a Washington-apples effect.
26Both per unit and ad valorem trade costs are only a function of distance with respectively elasticities
of δ = 0.05 and η = 0.1.
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Table 4: Estimated elasticities of fob-prices with respect to the extensive margin and fixed
export costs
Variable Av. coefficient Av. Standard error Av. Coefficient Av. Standard error
Skill abundance SkUk 0.0922 0.00562 0.0930 0.00528
(0.0376) (0.00252) (0.0237) (0.00120)
Distance dkl 0.123 0.00117 0.122 0.00138
(0.00120) (0.000412) (0.0678) (0.000316)
Extensive margin emk −0.00465 0.00541
(0.0534) (0.00527)
Export fixed costs fklfkk −0.0304 0.401
(0.700) (0.0983)
The table displays the average coefficient and the average standard error of 200 fixed effects regressions
of the fob-price on skill abundance, distance and the extensive margin, all measured in logs.
The extensive margin is defined as the share of exporting firms relative to domestic firms. Export fixed costs
is defined as export fixed costs divided by domestic fixed costs, both averaged over all trading partners.
Standard errors of the 200 repititions in parentheses
large, indicating that the coefficient varies hugely over the 200 iterations. Therefore, we
can conclude that the extensive margin does not have a significant impact on traded goods
prices in our model. In column two we also examine the effect of exporting fixed costs
relative to domestic fixed costs. Also this variable does not have a significant impact on
traded goods prices.
4.3 Effect of Distance on the Skill Premium
In this subsection we study the effect of distance on the skill premium. There is both a
supply-side and demand-side effect. Since distance has a stronger effect on per unit than
on ad valorem trade costs, an increase in distance makes the Washington apples effect
stronger. Therefore firms raise the quality of exported goods. As a result the relative
demand for skilled labor rises and therefore the nominal skill premium, representing the
supply-side effect. Since quality is more important for higher income high-skilled workers,
the increase in quality leads to a stronger decrease in the quality adjusted price index for
the high-skilled, a demand side effect. In table 5 we display the estimated elasticities of
the skill premium with respect to skill abundance and average distance of each country
vis-a-vis all its trading partners employing the outcomes of model simulations repeated
200 times based on the baseline parameter values. We display the average elasticity of the
nominal skill premium, w
s
wu
, reflecting the supply-side effect, of the quality-adjusted price
ratio, P
u
P s
, reflecting the demand-side effect, and of real skill premium, w
s
P s
/w
u
Pu
, reflecting
the overall effect. The table shows that distance has a significant, positive effect on the
nominal skill premium, with an elasticity of about 0.023, which means that a doubling
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of distance of a country vis-a-vis all its trading partners will raise its skill premium by
1.6 percent (20.023 − 1)).27 So, our finding provides support for the supply-side effect just
described. There are two reasons for the relatively modest effect of distance on the skill
premium. First, domestic quality will be adjusted downwards in response to an increase
in the relative price of skilled labor. This adjustment limits the initial effect on the skill
premium. Second, an increase in distance raises both per unit and ad valorem trade costs,
reducing the share of production for the export market and thus reducing the share of
goods with high quality.
The table also shows that the quality-adjusted price ratio of low-skilled to high-skilled
rises significantly with distance, although the effect is an order smaller than the supply-side
effect on the nominal skill premium. This finding provides support for the demand-side
effect: a larger distance raises the Washington-apples effect, which in turn raises quality
benefiting high-skilled workers more than low-skilled workers. The elasticity of the real
skill premium with respect to distance in column 5 is the sum of the elasticities of the
nominal skill premium and the price ratio.
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Figure 1: Partial scatter plot of skill premium on distance
Figure 1 shows the partial scatter plot of the skill premium on distance (both measured
in logs) following from the partial regression of the skill premium on distance with skill
abundance as control variable and importer-repitition fixed effects. The figure shows five
sets of scattered points corresponding with observations in the five different countries. The
scatter plot shows clearly that there is a positive relation in the model between distance
27Skill abundance has a strong negative effect on the skill premium, as expected.
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Table 5: Estimated elasticities of skill premium with respect to skill abundance and
distance with simulated data
Variable w
s
wu s.e.
pu
ps s.e.
ws
P s /
wu
Pu s.e.
Skill abundance SkUk −0.797 0.00507 0.000873 0.000437 −0.797 0.00507
(0.00318) (0.000508) (0.0000114) (0.0000112) (0.00300) (0.000575)
Distance dkl 0.0233 0.00506 0.0000362 0.0000114 0.0234 0.00505
(0.0100) (0.000571) (0.0000146) (0.0000112) (0.0100) (0.000571)
The table displays the average coefficient and the average standard error of 200 regressions of
the nominal skill premium w
s
wu and the price ratio
pu
ps on skill abundance and average distance of
each country vis-a-vis all its trading partners, all measured in logs.
Standard errors of the 200 repititions in parentheses
and the skill premium.
A reduction of ad valorem trade costs works in the model like an increase in distance,
as the elasticity of ad valorem trade costs with respect to distance is smaller than the
elasticity of per unit trade costs with respect to distance. So with lower ad valorem
trade costs the Washington apples effect becomes stronger raising the skill premium. We
summarize the above discussion as follows:
Observation 1 In the model with per unit and ad valorem trade costs and demand for
quality varying with income, a reduction in distance raises the real skill premium through
a strengthening of the Washington Apples effect.
We perform two additional exercises to get more insight into the effect of trade costs
and distance on the skill premium. First we compare the average skill premium in all
countries in a situation with actual distance between trading partners and a situation
with distance between trading partners set equal to average domestic distance of the five
countries. This exercise thus shows what the effect is of neutralizing distance between all
trading partners. Increasing distance between trading partners from the domestic level
to the actual level leads as expected to an increase in the average skill premium in all
countries from 1.31 to 1.66 and the difference is highly significant. Increasing distance for
sales in other countries raises the quality of goods sold because of the Washington apples
effect and this drives up the relative demand for skilled workers.
Second, we simulate the model two times, first switching off the supply-side mechanism
and then the demand-side mechanism by first setting η at zero and then setting λ at zero.
The Washington apples effect creates an effect of distance both through the demand-side
as a result of non-homothetic preferences with higher income agents demanding higher
quality goods and through the supply-side as a result of non-homothetic technology with
quality being skill intensive. We thus assess the relative contribution of demand-side
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Table 6: Estimated elasticities of skill premium with respect to skill abundance and
distance with simulated data with η = 0 and λ = 0
Variable w
s
wu s.e.
pu
ps s.e.
ws
P s /
wu
Pu s.e.
η = 0
Skill abundance SkUk −0.833 5.42e− 07 −4.51e− 06 0.0000113 −0.833 0.0000116
(2.44e− 06) (3.04e− 06) (0.000148) (3.51e− 07) (0.000148) (2.05e− 06)
Distance dkl 9.05e− 07 5.39e− 07 0.0000943 0.0000112 0.0000953 0.0000116
(5.42e− 06) (3.02e− 06) (1.14e− 06) (3.57e− 07) (5.65e− 06) (2.04e− 06)
λ = 0
Skill abundance SkUk −0.797 0.00521 6.90e− 14 8.46e− 14 −0.797 0.00521
(0.00440) (0.000744) (4.88e− 13) (5.98e− 13) (0.00440) (0.000744)
Distance dkl 0.0238 0.00519 −1.51e− 13 8.44e− 14 0.0238 0.00519
(0.00914) (0.000741) (1.07e− 12) (5.97e− 13) (0.00914) (0.000741)
The table displays the average coefficient and the average standard error of 50 regressions of
the nominal skill premium w
s
wu and the price ratio
pu
ps on skill abundance and average distance of
each country vis-a-vis all its trading partners, all measured in logs, for respectively η = 0 and λ = 0
Standard errors of the 50 repititions in parentheses
and supply-side forces by switching off respectively non-homothetic technology and non-
homothetic preferences. Table 6 displays the results. The results are as expected. If we
set η at zero, the effect of distance on the nominal skill premium becomes zero and the
supply-side effect disappears. With η equal to zero, skill intensity of production is not
related to quality and hence the increasing quality as a result of the Washington apples
effect does not affect the skill premium. Instead the small demand-side effect on the price
ratio remains in place. If instead we set λ at zero, the effect of distance on the price ratio
becomes zero and the demand-side effect disappears. The quality-adjusted price is the
same for both income groups with λ equal to zero and henceforth the Washington apples
effect has no differential impact on the quality-adjusted prices of the two income groups.
The supply-side effect on the nominal skill premium instead remains in place.
4.4 Robustness Checks
To check the robustness of our simulations, we evaluate the effect of variation in the
parameters σ, λ, θ, κ, ε, fkl, fkl/fkk, η and δ on the estimated elasticities of both fob-
prices and the skill premium with respect to distance and skill abundance. We vary these
parameters one at a time. Table 7 shows how the elasticities vary with the parameter
values. The second column shows the minimum and maximum value of the different
parameters in the robustness checks and for comparison the baseline value. The next two
columns show the elasticities of the fob price with respect to distance and skill abundance
corresponding with the maximum and minimum parameter values. The last column
24
displays the elasticities of the real skill premium with respect to distance for the minimum
and maximum parameter values. The reported elasticities are averages based upon 50
repititions with the reported parameter values.
We can make the following five observations on the robustness exercises. First, signs of
the three elasticities of the export price with respect to skill abundance and distance and of
the elasticity of the skill premium with respect to distance always stay the same. Second,
the parameters λ, fkl
fkk
and fkl have only a relatively small impact on the elasticities. So,
although the level of fixed costs was set somewhat arbitrary this has almost no effect on
the model outcomes. Third, the elasticity of the skill premium with respect to distance,
reported in the last columns of 7, always stays positive but also relatively small.28 Fourth,
the effect of the substitution elasticity σ on the elasticity of the export price with respect
to skill abundance is positive but small. The sign of this interaction effect is hence opposite
to what we find in the empirics, but like in the empirics where the effect is non-significant,
the effect is small. Fifth and finally, the parameters with a relatively strong impact on
the elasticity of the export price with respect to skill abundance are θ and η. We interpret
the influence of these parameters on the elasticities as follows. θ is an inverse measure
of the marginal cost to produce quality. So, at a small θ it is expensive to produce high
quality goods and henceforth a cost advantage to produce high quality goods because of
a relative abundance of skilled workers will hardly lead to higher quality goods. A similar
intuition holds for the effect of η on the elasticity of the export price with respect to skill
abundance, which rises with η.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we put forward a theoretical mechanism to explain the finding in Schott
(2004) that more skill abundant countries export higher quality, higher priced goods. Fac-
tor input bundles are nonhomothetic with higher quality goods requiring relatively more
skilled workers. This implies that in skill abundant countries firms have an incentive
to produce higher quality goods. With marginal costs rising in quality, higher quality
goods also have higher prices. We incorporated this mechanism in a monopolistic com-
petition model of trade adding a role for distance and importer gdp per capita in the
determination of traded goods prices implying a Washington-apples effect. We estimated
the effect of skill abundance and distance using a dataset with multiple importers and
28Although not reported, the elasticity of the skill premium with respect to skill abundance hardly
varies with parameters values. For the parameter variations explored it oscillates between −0.816 and
−0.776.
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Table 7: Simulated elasticities of the traded goods price with respect to distance, skill
abundance and exporter gdp per capita and of the skill premium with respect to distance.
Parameter Parameter Elasticity px Elasticity px Elasticity ws/wu
values wrt S/U wrt distance wrt distance
Min Base Max Min Max Min Max Min Max
σ 3.05 6.07 6.2 0.0258 0.0925 0.121 0.141 0.0208 0.0233
λ 0.01 0.021 0.05 0.0864 0.0979 0.121 0.124 0.0231 0.0259
θ 0.4 0.61 0.7 0.0212 0.122 0.119 0.136 0.0140 0.0257
κ 0.05 0.1 0.25 0.0641 0.123 0.0871 0.265 0.0199 0.0255
ε 1.2 1.2 1.8 0.0647 0.089 0.123 0.138 0.0232 0.0301
fkl 0.5 1 2.5 0.0765 0.0925 0.121 0.127 0.0233 0.0246
fkl
fkk
1 1 2.25 0.0876 0.0954 0.121 0.123 0.0234 0.0220
η 0.6 0.8 1.4 0.112 0.643 0.117 0.121 0.0233 0.0337
δ 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.0671 0.0925 0.0943 0.124 0.0227 0.0241
exporters containing export unit values as proxy for export prices. We found as expected
that traded goods prices rise in the two mentioned variables and used the estimated elas-
ticities to calibrate the parameters of the model. Simulating the impact of changes in
distance, we found an effect of distance on the skill premium in our model. Countries at
a larger distance from their trading partners display a stronger Washington-apples effect
raising the quality of goods sold and bought. Because of the skill-intensity of high-quality
goods this raises the nominal skill premium (a supply-side effect) and because of the
non-homotheticity of demand this also reduces the relative quality-adjusted price level of
high-income, high-skilled workers (a demand-side effect).
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Appendix A Derivations Theoretical Model
In this appendix we present derivations of some of the equations in the main text in
chronological order.
Equations (10) and (11)
Taking first order conditions of the expression for profit in equation (9) with respect
to pkl and αkl leads to:
(1− σ) zσ−1kl p−σkl P σ−εkl P εl Il + σz
1
θ
+σ−1
kl τklp
−σ−1
kl P
σ−ε
kl P
ε
l IlCBkl = 0 (A.1)
(σ − 1) zσ−2kl p1−σkl P σ−εkl P εl Il −
(
1
θ
+ σ − 1
)
z
1
θ
+σ−2
kl τklp
−σ
kl P
σ−ε
kl P
ε
l IlCBkl
−
(
z
1
θ
+σ−1
kl τklp
−σ
kl P
σ−ε
kl P
ε
l Il + fkl
) ∂CBkl
∂zkl
= 0 (A.2)
The first FOC in (A.1) can be rearranged easily into the markup equation in (10) in the
main text. Substituting the markup equation into the second FOC in (A.2) leads after
some rearranging to equation (11). Substituting the free entry condition into equation
(11) then gives:
pklqkl
σ
(
(σ − 1) θ−1
θ
zkl
− σ
CBkl
∂CB
∂zkl
)
= 0 (A.3)
Subsituting equation (13) into equation (A.3) leads to equation (11) in the main text.
Equation (15)
Substituting the expression for CBkl in equation (8) into equation (11) and rearranging
leads to:
σ−1
σ
θ−1
θ
(1− ρ)
η
=
(zηklw
s
k)
1−ρ
(zηklw
s
k)
1−ρ + (wuk)
1−ρ (A.4)
Dividing by (wsk)
1−ρ in the numerator and denominator on the RHS and defining ζ as
ζ = σ−1
σ
θ−1
θ
1
η
gives:
ζ =
(zηkl)
1−ρ
(zηkl)
1−ρ +
(
wuk
wsk
)1−ρ (A.5)
Rearranging equation (A.5) leads to the following equation, which is equivalent to equation
(15) in the main text:
wuk
wsk
= zηkl
(
1− ζ
ζ
) 1
1−ρ
(A.6)
ĈBkl = 0 in equation (20)
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We rewrite the expression for the cost of input bundles in equation (8) first as follows:
CBkl = w
u
k
((
zηkl
wsk
wuk
)1−ρ
+ 1
) 1
1−ρ
Log differentiating with respect to zηkl and the relative wage
wsk
wuk
keeping the unskilled wage
wuk constant, reflecting that we could choose this price as numeraire, gives:
ĈBkl =
(
zηkl
wsk
wuk
)1−ρ
(
zηkl
wsk
wuk
)1−ρ
+ 1
ŵks
wku
+
(
zηkl
wsk
wuk
)1−ρ
(
zηkl
wsk
wuk
)1−ρ
+ 1
ẑηkl (A.7)
Variables with a hat indicate relative changes. We can express ẑηkl as a function of
ŵsk
wuk
by
log differentiating equation (15):
ẑηkl = −
ŵsk
wuk
(A.8)
Substituting (A.8) into equation (A.7) makes immediately clear that ĈBkl = 0.
Equation (28)
Because there are two income groups we cannot work with quality-adjusted price and
quantity like Feenstra and Romalis (2014). Using the expressions for demand and costs
in the extended model in respectively equations (24) and (25), profit for sales from k to l
can be expressed as follows:29
pik = p
1−σ
kl
∑
v=s,u
zkl
αvl (σ−1) (P vkl)
σ−ε (P vl )
εQvl
− τkl
(
z
1
θ
kl
CBkl
ϕk
+ Tkl
)
p−σkl
∑
v=s,u
z
αvl (σ−1)
kl (P
v
kl)
σ−ε (P vl )
εQvl − fkl
CBkl
ϕk
(A.9)
Taking first order conditions of the expression for profit in equation (A.9) with respect to
29An extended version of the following derivation is provided in a supplementary appendix available
upon request.
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pkl and zkl gives:
0 = (1− σ) p−σkl
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The first FOC in (A.10) can be easily rearranged into the markup equation in (27) in the
main text. Substituting the markup equation and the expressions for revenues pklqkl and
pklq
v
kl into the second FOC, equation (A.11), leads after rearranging to:
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∑
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As a next step we substitute the FE, pklqkl =
σfklCBkl
ϕk
, giving:
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Subsituting the expression for the derivative of CB with respect to zkl, equation (13),
into equation (A.13) leads after rearranging to:
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Dropping pklqkl
σ
and rearranging gives the FOC in equation (28) in the main text.
Second Order Condition (SOC) for quality zkl
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The derivative of pikl with respect to zkl in equation (14) is rewritten slightly:
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Since the term between brackets is zero in the optimum, we only have to differentiate the
terms between brackets with respect to zkl to derive the SOC:
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Rearranging leads to:
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So, the SOC is satisfied if ρ < 1.
To derive the SOC in the extended model, we rewrite the FOC in equation (28) as
follows:
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Differentiating equation (A.17) with respect to zkl gives after rearranging:
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We calculate this second derivative in the simulations finding that it is always satisfied.
Equations (30) and (31)
Differentiating the cost function in equation (25) with respect to wsk and summing
34
over the firms Nkl gives:
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The free entry condition, pklqkl =
CBkl
ϕk
σfkl, can be solved for qkl applying the pricing
equation in (27):
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Substituting (A.20) into (A.19) and rearranging leads to equation (30) in the main text.
Equation (33)
We follow the approach in Venables (1994) to determine the share of exporting firms
Nlk/Nkk from the free entry condition and the definitions of the price indexes. We can
write the free entry condition as follows:
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Substituting the markup rule in equation (27) on the RHS and LHS leads to:
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Next, we divide the domestic by the importing FE in equation (A.22):∑
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As a next step, we express the price index as a function of the number of varieties:
P vlk = N
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Substituting equation (A.24) into equation (A.23) and rearranging leads to equation (33)
in the main text.
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Appendix B Comparison of Our Results with Schott
(2004)
In this Appendix we further explore the differences between our results on skill abundance
and the estimation results in Schott (2004). Our estimated coefficients on relative skill
abundance are smaller in all specifications than the coefficients presented in Schott (2004).
Schott (2004) finds a coefficient of 0.501 on skill abundance (table 5 in Schott (2004)),
whereas our estimate varies between 0.057 and 0.095 thus being almost a factor 10 smaller
in some of the specifications (in both estimates the variables are in logs).30
In the first column of Table 8 we replicate Schott’s specification using our data, re-
stricting the sample of importers to the USA as Schott (2004) did and using Schott’s
measure of skill abundance, the share of skilled workers among all workers. The coeffi-
cient is somewhat smaller than that found by Schott (2004), although the difference is
small. In the next column (column 2) we extend the sample to include all importers from
our dataset and keep on using Schott’s measure of skill abundance. The coefficient again
becomes somewhat smaller, indicating that restricting the sample to only the USA as
importer leads to a higher impact of exporter skill abundance on exported goods prices.
In the next specification we rerun the regression again restricting the sample to only
the USA as importer, but with our measure of skill abundance. While Schott (2004)
measures skill abundance as the share of skilled workers in total workers, we follow our
theoretical model and measure skill abundance as the share of skilled to unskilled workers.
Given this definition, our coefficient is expected to be smaller (since the number of skilled
workers divided by the number of unskilled workers will be larger than the number of
skilled divided by the number of unskilled plus skilled workers, the coefficient of the latter
should be bigger). Indeed, this is what we see in column 3, with the coefficient of skill
abundance using our definition being less than half of that using Schott (2004) definition.
Column 4 and 5 explore further how the coefficient of skill abundance changes as we
include our control variables. The coefficient gets smaller as we introduce the control
variables, and again it is even smaller when all the importers are not restricted to the
USA. The final column displays results using our measure of skill abundance, limiting the
sample to the USA as the only importer and including control variables. This specification
results in an even lower coefficient on skill abundance.
30The coefficient on GDP per capita in our estimates is similar to Schott (2004) who finds a coefficient
of 0.13, whereas we find a coefficient 0.15 in the linear specification and a marginal effect of 0.19 in the
non linear specification.
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Table 8: Comparison of Schott (2004) and our results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Schott’s Schott’s specification Our measure of Schott’s measure Schott’s measure Our measure
specification with large sample skill abundance USA only importer large sample USA only importer
only importer USA with control variables with control variables with control variables
ln (S/L) 0.363 0.249 0.160 0.109
(0.108)*** (0.062)*** (0.097) (0.050)**
ln (S/U) 0.151 0.098
(0.040)*** (0.032)***
lnGDPpc 0.147 0.144 0.148
(0.034)*** (0.023)*** (0.031)***
ln distance 0.134 0.125 0.136
(0.080)* (0.016)*** (0.083)
cons 1.141 1.511 2.504 0.410 0.690 0.958
(0.447)** (0.249)*** (0.053)*** (0.836) (0.282)** (0.755)
Adjusted R2 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.61 0.63 0.62
N 964,392 23,632,862 964,392 964,392 23,632,862 964,392
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Importer-product-time fixed effects are included in all specifications with more than one importer,
and product-time fixed effects in specifications with USA as the only importer.Standard errors are clustered by exporters. ln (S/L) is the
exporter’s skill abundance defined as the log of the ratio of skilled to total workers. ln (S/U) is the exporter’s skill abundance defined as the
log of the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers. ln distance is the log of distance between the exporter and importer country capitals.
lnGDPpc is the log of GDP per capita of the exporter country in 1000 dollars.
Thus these results show that there are three factors which all lead to a smaller coeffi-
cient in our results. Extending the number of importers, including other control variables,
and using our measure of skill abundance all lead to lower coefficients of exporter skill
abundance on exported goods prices.
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Appendix C Descriptive Statistics and List of Coun-
tries
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Histogram and summary statistics for skill abundance (ln(S/U))
Figure 2: Histogram and summary statistics for relative skill abundance
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Histogram and summary statistics for GDP per capita
Figure 3: Histogram and summary statistics for GDP per capita
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no.obs  : 23632862
median :    7.831
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Histogram and summary statistics for distance
Figure 4: Histogram and summary statistics for distance
Table 9: Correlation table
Variables Skill abundance (ln(S/U)) Ln GDP per capita Ln Distance
Skill abundance (ln(S/U)) 1.000
Ln GDP per capita 0.244 1.000
(0.000)
Ln Distance -0.204 -0.121 1.000
(0.000) (0.000)
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Table 10: List of countries
List of exporters
Argentina Ecuador Kyrgyz Republic Peru
Armenia Spain Cambodia Philippines
Australia Estonia Korea, Rep. Poland
Austria Finland Lebanon Portugal
Azerbaijan France Sri Lanka Paraguay
Bulgaria United Kingdom Lithuania Romania
Bosnia and Herzegovina Georgia Latvia Russian Federation
Brazil Greece Macao Singapore
Canada Guatemala Morocco Slovak Republic
Switzerland Guyana Madagascar Slovenia
Chile Hong Kong, China Mexico Sweden
Costa Rica Croatia Macedonia, FYR Syrian Arab Republic
Cuba Hungary Mauritius Thailand
Cyprus India Malaysia Tajikistan
Czech Republic Ireland Netherlands Trinidad and Tobago
Germany Israel Norway Turkey
Denmark Italy Pakistan Uruguay
Dominican Republic Kazakhstan Panama South Africa
List of importers
Argentina Spain Korea, Rep. Oman
Australia Finland Sri Lanka Peru
Austria France Lithuania Poland
Bolivia Gabon Latvia Portugal
Brazil United Kingdom Macao Romania
Central African Republic Greece Morocco El Salvador
Canada Guatemala Madagascar Slovak Republic
Switzerland Hong Kong, China Mexico Slovenia
Chile Honduras Macedonia, FYR Sweden
China Croatia Mauritius Togo
Colombia Hungary Malawi Thailand
Cyprus India Malaysia Tunisia
Germany Ireland Nicaragua Turkey
Denmark Italy Netherlands Uruguay
Ecuador Jordan Norway United States
Egypt, Arab Rep. Japan
41
